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4I
I am dead, again. 
I am restarting Joel, 
or rather restarting myself walking as Joel, 
trying to sneak through the plague-infested streets of some godforsaken 
city in which the end of the world has already happened. My job is to smug-
gle Ellie, a teenage girl who has lost her parents in a large-scale apocalypse 
in which most of the humans seem to have perished, across the country. I 
don’t quite understand what happened then and I don’t really know what’s 
happening now. I duck and dive, grab a brick, follow a green triangle, while 
all the time hacking furiously at the plastic buttons of a device I’m holding 
in my hand, one whose functions, shape and mode of behavior don’t seem 
to be making any sense. And I’m dead again. A bullet came from around 
the corner, with Ellie cowering behind a pile of rubbish. I failed her again. 
I failed again. This is not good. This is not fun. Get me out of here. 
And yet I keep coming back, returning over and over again to the 
same level of The Last of Us Remastered,1 an adventure-survival video game 
set in an undefined near-future in which all the hope is gone and yet you 
keep going. My progress is minimal, my speed almost static. It is as if the 
game is playing me while I am trying to run away. But I keep returning. 
5My experience of being in the game is of someone who is not a gamer, 
who doesn’t understand the rules, the principles, the proprioceptive expec-
tations, the whole navigational dynamics between the screen, the interface, 
and their own body and mind. I keep returning because I’m pulled in by 
the oddity of being so spectacularly bad at something that, at first glance, 
looks quite simple. And I’m not really getting much better at it, despite 
my multiple attempts at pointing, turning, clicking, and moving. I am also 
strangely drawn to the ruin porn of the game set up, to its weird scenarios 
and improbable architectures. I want to linger there, to spend time among 
the debris of this post-global universe that has been taken over by a myste-
rious fungal infection but that has retained many traces of the world that 
once was. It is precisely this uncanny familiarity of the spaces around me 
that makes me go back to the game over and over again, to see it afresh. 
Yet where is the “me” in all this? And what am I really seeing? How am I 
seeing it, and with what?
I forget about Ellie, about Joel, about myself as Joel, and about the 
whole improbable story about the Cordyceps fungus that is haunting the 
world I am traversing. I slow down to the point of stopping, I want to take 
it all in. I pause, I look around, I don’t care about being shot anymore. I am 
interested in a different kind of shooting, one that doesn’t kill, that doesn’t 
use a gun as its mode of access. I screen-shoot, or rather Joel as me, together 
with this whole unwieldy operation that involves the black thing in my 
hand attached with a cord to the black box, my body, Joel’s body, all of us, 
we take the world around us in, we freeze it, we temporarily make it ours.

7II
There is a long history of gamers taking screenshot images of their 
achievements and memorializing interesting-looking locations discovered on 
their game quests. Recognizing in those voluntarily shared digital mementoes 
an opportunity for free and “authentic” marketing campaigns, conducted 
by “real players” committing so much of their time to playboring in virtual 
environments, game companies identified a PR opportunity. Cashing in 
on the ongoing practice, many developers introduced a dedicated camera 
mode to their games—from a simple camera device held by a character, such 
as a reporter in Beyond Good and Evil, through to a sophisticated camera 
function transforming the whole screen into a camera while mimicking the 
exposure and processing of a real-life optical device, as in aforementioned 
The Last of Us, or even an option for augmented-reality capture, e.g. in 
Pokémon Go. The technical affordance, coupled with gamers’ desire to shape, 
save and share, led to the emergence of a new para-photographic genre 
known as in-game photography, aka “screenshotting.” As Matteo Bittanti 
explains, “‘Screenshot-ing’ or ‘screengrabbing’ is an umbrella term that 
defines a variety of in-game photography performances whose common 
denominator is the collection of visual mementos by the player. Rather than 
using a virtual gun to destroy the environments she or he encounters, the 
gamer becomes a collector, an avatar-with-a-photo-camera, a flaneur of 
virtual spaces. The collected pictures are subsequently enhanced with the 
aid of Photoshop and similar tools and shared online, via flickr or tumblr.”2 
For many gamers, screenshotting has become an activity in its own right, 
8with online realities now functioning, as explained by games scholar Cindy 
Poremba, legitimate sites for photographic voyeurism. “If the process and ritual 
behind this image making is similar, the players themselves are validating the 
reality of their subjects simply by creating a document of these experiences. In 
this sense, players are taking real photos, just in virtual spaces,”3 argues Poremba. 
Yet imagistic verisimilitude, fueled by indexical fantasies associated with the 
photographic medium, has been abandoned by more creative in-game photographers. 
Remediating the aesthetic trends of analogue photography, artist-gamer Gareth 
Damian Martin has scoured the hidden nooks of the popular action-adventure 
game Grand Theft Auto V to produce moody anti-utopian shots of what are liter-
ally no-places. Carefully framed and shot with an analogue camera, in black and 
white, with filmic grain becoming part of the process,4 his images create a haunting 
panorama of the game’s outskirts. Part documentary, part street photography, 
part cyberpunk, Martin’s “heterotopias,” as he terms them, evoke an uncanny 
sensation of the world’s edges and limits. Riffing on the post-apocalyptic tenor 
and visuality of many popular games, they help us envisage this world’s end (and 
also the end of this world, and of our world on the other side of the screen), 
while framing it for our comfort and pleasure. The practice of photographing 
games’ edges and ends has inevitably led to a heated discussion about the frayed 
edges of the very medium involved. Traditionalists, such as Wasim Ahmad, 
writer for the photographic website FStoppers, have insisted: “It May Be Art, 
But In-Game Images Aren’t ‘Photography.’”5 Martin, in turn, has been adamant 
that “photography is a useful term” for this practice “as it connects the work to a 
heritage and history of conceptual, still-life and object photography that stretches 
all the way back to the beginning of the medium.”6
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I came to in-game photography at a workshop run by Martin at The 
Photographers’ Gallery in London in July 2018.7 The most clueless of the 
group when it came to gaming, and probably far less keen than the other 
participants on upholding the conventions of the photographic medium, I 
was absolutely mesmerized by the visual and conceptual experiment unfold-
ing on multiple screens. That workshop was my calling card for getting 
involved in an alternative way of sensing and seeing, and an alternative 
mode of producing technical images,8 one that bore resemblance to what 
was familiar and yet that shifted the parameters of the game. Navigating 
the generational and kinetic difficulties of a non-gamer in the visually 
attractive, high-resolution 3D game environment of The Last of Us—the 
first game I bought together with a PlayStation 4 console, I turned a blind 
eye and deaf ear to the clunky story and its wooden dialogues, and followed 
instead the enthralling visuality unfolding on the screen in front of me. 
Like Martin, I was drawn to the game’s edges, spaces half-gratuitously put 
the world’s edges and limits
the world’s edges and limits
s i
i lti s
in by the 
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in by the designers yet not really designed for the player to spend too 
much time in. Forfeiting the speed, the action, the trophies that presented 
themselves to me on the way, the whole gamey premise of the game, I 
mobilized my photographic apparatus—my technical knowhow and ways 
of seeing photographically developed over the years—to start making the 
gameworld a little bit more mine. 
Even if not explicitly engaging with image-making as part of their plot, 
most 3D games rely on camera technology to navigate their characters. In my 
foray into gaming I became intrigued by the two vantage points respectively 
offered by first- and third-person games. First-person games, such as the walking 
game Everybody’s Gone to the Rapture (which shares a post-apocalyptic story 
and look with The Last of Us), developed from first-person shooters, i.e., games 
in which the player sees the action through the avatar’s eyes while becoming 
an extension of the shooting device, be it a gun or a camera. In third-person 
games, such as The Last of Us, the camera is placed slightly behind and above the 
avatar, although its angles and positioning can vary and change, depending on 
the game. The player is then linked to the avatar, via the camera and the controller, 
through an invisible “ray of light.” In both types of games, players ultimately take on 
the camera function, no matter if they engage in the practice of screenshotting or not. 
I became entranced by the virtual environment of 3D games because it offered me a 
space in which I could test or even contest the legacy of the photographic medium by 
virtualizing different possibilities, simulating different outcomes and framing different 
viewpoints. Yet the experience offered me more than that: I saw in the game environ-
ment a laboratory for experimenting with possibilities of retraining perception and 
vision, of reframing what and how I (or, dare I say, “we”) see the world, of learning 
some new affordances. 
ously put
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III
Why was this retraining and reframing needed? And do we fully 
understand how we see the world in the first place? Specifically, could 
we say that visual perception operates like a photographic camera, by 
cutting reality into discrete images and then stitching them together into 
a relatively coherent and fluid picture of the world? Or is it more like a 
cinematograph, projecting the film in front of ours eyes and subsequently 
discretizing individual stills from it? For centuries, the dominant model of 
vision was premised on the idea that the eye was a passive vehicle of image 
reception. Early photographic cameras were modelled on this very idea of 
the disembodied and static eye that merely captured images coming from 
“the world.”9 While it was assumed that we saw reality via an array of still 
images, our ability to perceive motion was explained by an optical illusion 
of each singular image supposedly “lingering” on the viewer’s retina. Their 
overlapping was said to create an illusion of movement. This conviction led 
to the emergence of the “unifying myth”10 of film studies, i.e., the “persistence 
of vision” theory. In their tellingly-titled article, “The Myth of Persistence 
of Vision” published in 1978, Joseph Anderson and Barbara Fisher pointed 
out that “after-images, since they are in fact tracings of stimulation left upon 
the retina, yield stabilized images.”11 They explained that, if after-images 
were actually involved in the creation of the illusion of movement, “the 
result would be a plethora of images resulting from the tracings scattered 
about the retina according to each separate fixation of the eye”12 rather than 
smooth movement. 
14
The after-image theory of perception was originally refuted by 
psychologist Max Wertheimer. In 1912 Wertheimer published an 
article titled “Experimental Studies on the Seeing of Motion,”13 in 
which he demonstrated that the belief that we saw still images first, 
with motion somehow “added” afterwards, was incorrect. Many film 
scholars subsequently attempted to reconcile their own earlier intuitions 
about perception with the new state of knowledge. In his 1914 book, 
Moving Pictures: How They Are Made and Worked, Frederick A. Talbot 
suggested that:
The eye is in itself a wonderful camera....The picture is photographed in 
the eye and transmitted from that point to the brain....When it reaches the 
brain, a length of time is required to bring about its construction, for the 
brain is something like the photographic plate, and the picture requires 
developing. In this respect the brain is somewhat sluggish, for when it has 
formulated the picture imprinted upon the eye, it will retain the picture 
even after the reality has disappeared from sight.14
With this description of the perception of movement, Talbot 
produced a delightful mergence of organs, with the eye-
brain conjuncture becoming a kind of photo lab. It is 
important to notice that the notion of “persistence 
of vision,” which was premised upon the ret-
inal imprint of an image, did not entirely 
disappear from this theory: it only 
shifted to a different section 
of the “lab.” 
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Since the 1960s perceptual and cognitive psychology has widely adopted 
the assumption, supported by numerous experiments, that the location where 
visual processing primarily occurs is the brain. The following explanation 
for how we see the world is shared by the majority of scientists working 
with vision, be it in perceptive psychology, cognitive science or neurosci-
ence. Light coming from an object is said to stimulate the cells in our eye, 
producing electric impulses as a result of the stimulation. Those impulses, 
containing information about light and color, function as raw data that is 
then transmitted, via the optic nerve, to the brain. The brain refines and 
translates the data into what we subsequently recognize as images. The 
perception of movement arises from seeing the small difference between 
a series of radically changing stationary images and (involuntarily) 
“interpreting” it as movement.15 Drawing on the 2006 paper published in 
Nature by Marc A. Sommer and Robert H. Wurtz,16 science writer Julia 
Layton has attempted to clarify how the picture of the world we obtain ends 
up being so stable, despite the fact that our eyes themselves are in constant 
movement, which involves exploration, scanning, low-frequency tremor and 
saccadic jumps. Using Sommer and Wurtz’ discovery that “the brain keeps 
track of self-movement … by monitoring an internal copy, or corollary 
discharge, of motor commands,”17 Layton describes our eyes as “the video 
cameras of our brain.”18 Yet her actual explanation is more reminiscent of 
the working of a stills camera: “They take before and after shots of every 
focused image and compare them in order to confirm stability.”19 She goes 
on to clarify the process further:
17
Before your eyes actually sense an object, your brain takes its own picture of 
that object for comparison purposes. It knows where your eyes are going to 
move next, and it forms an image of the object that precedes our conscious, 
visual perception of it. Then, when our eyes do perceive that object in a 
sensory way (meaning we can see it), our brain has already laid the frame-
work for a smooth transition. There’s no shakiness and no instability. The 
brain has anticipated what our eyes are going to see, and it uses that antic-
ipatory image for comparison to make sure the world has indeed remained 
stable in the split-second between the before shot and the after shot.20
Even though present-day research into visual perception challenges 
models based on the belief in one-to-one correspondence between physical 
stimuli and perceptual experiences, this does not stop science writers, 
philosophers as well as film and media theorists from seeking such corre-
spondences. In the process—and this is the point that is of key interest to 
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me here—they often reach for concepts borrowed from the image-making 
industry: from Julia Layton reporting on the experiment in the brain correlates 
of vision, as cited above, through to Gilles Deleuze’s acknowledgement that 
“The circuits and linkages of the brain don’t pre-exist the stimuli, corpuscles 
and particles that trace them,” which is summed up in his oft-cited quip: 
“The brain is the screen.”21 For neuroscientist Beau Lotto, in turn, “[t]he 
world out there is … our three-dimensional screen. Our receptors take the 
meaningless information they receive; then our brain, through interacting 
with the world, encodes the historical meaning of that information, and 
projects our subjective versions of color, shape, and distance onto things.”22 
Photographic and film technology therefore exists in a mutually constitutive 
relationship with technologies and narratives of vision.
The constitutive role of photo-technical metaphors in explaining vision 
is perhaps a symptom of that fact that, as highlighted by Anderson and 
Fisher’s sobering conclusion to their article, “even though we have been 
looking at motion pictures for three quarters of a century, we still do not 
understand the most basic perceptual principles.”23 This sense of perplexity 
is reiterated in the opening pages of the widely used psychology textbook, 
Sensation and Perception, with its author E. Bruce Goldstein admitting that 
“we still don’t understand perception.”24 The difficulty refers specifically 
to understanding how nerve impulses, or sodium and potassium molecules 
flying across a membrane, produce subjective perceptual experiences for us.
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In other words, advanced multidisciplinary research in neuroscience has not 
yet found a way to explain how the subjective experience of perception is 
constituted for us—a conundrum described by David Chalmers as a “hard 
problem of consciousness,”25 with perception arguably being foundational 
to the emergence of consciousness and a principal mode of generating 
subjective experience. This knowledge blind spot at the heart of visual 
perception studies perhaps explains why the shift from the retina to the brain 
in cognitive psychology has not really put to rest the mechanical metaphors 
of a human organ, be it the eye or the brain, as a camera, or, more broadly, 
an image-making apparatus, both in media-theoretical discussions and in 
scientific descriptions of the problem of vision.26
Yet this lingering cluster of photo-mechanical metaphors can also 
be a potent conceptual opportunity, I believe. Indeed, many humanities 
scholars are aware of the metaphorical aspect of all forms of message 
transmission, including scientific communication. They (or rather, we) 
use metaphors readily and playfully—while also remaining attuned to the 
historical specificity of what gets positioned as experience and evidence. 
The awareness that the eye is not a camera, that it does not see in frames 
per second and that it does not capture ready-made images which it then 
“sends” to the brain has thus enabled a new articulation of the process of 
perception. The demise of the persistence of vision model, with all its 
scientific error and metaphorical poeticity, has given way to its opposite: 
i.e., the premonition of vision, with the brain playing a much more active 
role in image construction. Yet this is not a straightforward conclusion 
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that, while the eye is not a camera, the brain perhaps might be. A much 
more creative model of perception emerges here instead, requiring us to 
rethink “the brain”—which really needs to be put in inverted commas—to 
refer to a whole apparatus that includes the observer and the thing observed, 
us and the world.
This phenomenological model, deemed an “ecology of perception,”27 
was originally associated with the work of psychologist James J. Gibson, 
but has recently been developed further by philosophers Alva Noë and 
Shaun Gallagher.28 It has also been taken up by many creative disciplines, 
from dance through to architecture and design. Perception here stands for 
capturing what the world affords us and remaining open to it—but it also 
involves introducing cuts to what Gibson termed an “optic flow” by way of 
discretizing this flow into lines, edges, objects and, consequently, images. 
For Gibson, the optic flow names the apparent flow of objects experienced 
by the observer in her visual field as she moves through space.29 
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His The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, published in 1979, challenged 
the model of perception as a transmission of an image from an object to the 
eye—and then the brain. In its place Gibson offered the idea that perception 
was mobile, distributed and kinesthetic, and that it encapsulated the whole 
of the corporeal apparatus. In other words, vision for him required a move-
ment of the perceiving agent’s body, delivering simultaneous information 
about, and awareness of, “the world” and “the self in the world.”30 Building 
on the subsequent research in neuroscience and cognitive psychology, in 
the concluding words to their article, “The Myth of Persistence of Vision 
Revisited,” which was another attempt to debunk a model that had cast a 
shadow for longer than expected, Anderson and Anderson similarly con-
cluded that perception was an active process, one in which the corporeal 
apparatus of the observer—her eyes, brain, and the whole body—participated: 
“We rapidly sample the world about us, noting the things that change and 
the things that do not change. We turn our heads for a better view; we 
move left or right to gain additional information provided by a different 
angle. We move closer or farther away. We actively seek more information 
about things that interest us.”31 Perception thus extends from the brain into 
the world, with “the brain” standing for the dynamic space between the 
observer and the world. It is also inherently coupled with action. It would 
not therefore be too much of an exaggeration to say that I perceive therefore 
I act, with the reverse of this statement also having some veridical value. 
The key problem that emerges here is the need to understand the 
mechanism through which cuts are made in the optic flow. As discussed 
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understand the environment.”33 Even though nothing in the world is actually 
made up of lines and edges, “they eye and brain have evolved systems that 
encode these differentiating signals and process the information in such a 
deceptively casual manner that we start to believe that edges and lines are 
visible components of the ‘real world.’”34 We could therefore go so far as to 
suggest that “the brain,” which by now, as we have established, stands for 
a wider perceptive apparatus embracing our whole body and reaching out 
into the world, introduces edges and cuts into the imagistic flow: it cuts the 
environment for us to see it, and then helps us stitch it back together again.
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IV
The Flowcuts project presented here has allowed me to explore both 
the working of perception and the way we can understand it, conceptually 
and experientially. My investigation commenced with the images, with 
the written material developed in response to the image-making process. 
By revealing my method, I am not by any means promoting immersion in 
“pure experience” or advocating the superiority of practice over theory: my 
experience of screenshotting within gameworlds was of course always being 
mediated both by my ongoing photographic practice and by my knowledge 
of philosophy and media theory. The images that form the Flowcuts series 
were all captured from multiple angles around various scenes and locations 
I had come across, using the embedded camera function in the two games 
featuring post-apocalyptic scenarios I mentioned earlier, The Last of Us 
and Everyone Has Gone to the Rapture. Each image had been produced 
from overlaying, in Photoshop, views of the same scene captured from 
several different angles. It was then edited according to my own aesthetic 
preferences, fueled by the two games’ end-of-the-world landscapes and 
scenarios, in the photo-editing program called Lightroom. The retaining 
of the traces of multiple singular shots within the images was a nod on my 
part to various theories of perception. It was also an attempt to show the 
process of navigation between seeing movement and enacting cuts in the 
optical flow, a process that our visual apparatus constantly performs as part 
of what we know as “seeing.” The final images became what I began to 
call “image-concepts.” 
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I should clarify that my venture into the neuroscience research into 
perception presented in the previous section of this essay was not an attempt 
to justify or, worse, prove the correctness of my intimations about perception 
enacted in the images. Rather, I looked into the science material with a view 
to developing a satisfactory mode of “cutting” through the flow of ideas, 
affects and percepts with a view to temporarily stabilizing them into images. 
This approach was partly indebted to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, 
who in What Is Philosophy? had come up with a strategy for taming the 
chaos of the world and its multiple sensations exerted upon us with the help 
of “Chaoids.” This was the name they gave to art, science, and philosophy, 
three creative practices which they identified as the daughters of Chaos. In 
other words, Chaoids became for them different enablers for organizing 
matter and ideas into forms in three different registers and genres—and 
for creating concepts out of chaos. Importantly, for Deleuze and Guattari 
concepts do not serve “to replicate accurately in discourse specific segments 
of the world as it really is (as science does), but to propose articulations of 
and/or solutions to problems, to offer new and different perspectives on 
orientations toward the world.”35 Every concept is thus a “matter of artic-
ulation, of cutting and cross-cutting.”36
As Sarah Kember and I have argued elsewhere, the process of cutting 
needs to be seen as “one of the most fundamental and originary processes 
through which we emerge as ‘selves’ as we engage with matter and attempt 
to give it (and ourselves) form. Cutting reality into small pieces—with our 
eyes, our bodily and cognitive apparatus, our language, our memory, and 
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our technologies—we enact separation and 
relationality as the two dominant aspects 
of material locatedness in time.”37 The 
image-concepts presented here are therefore 
not just illustrations or visual metaphors of 
a philosophical or scientific problem: they 
are temporary stabilizations at the cross-
roads of art, science, and philosophy. They 
also serve as devices that can help me (and, 
hopefully, others) to approach and think 
through the problem. Once again, science is 
thus not evoked here as evidence but is rather 
mobilized in recognition of the fact that 
science research into cognition, perception, 
and vision has already been part of, or even 
shaped, the philosophical understanding of 
those concepts since ancient times—and that 
it has also generated (and been furthered 
by) artistic practice. Also, as discussed ear-
lier, film and media theory has always been 
engaged with, or even premised upon, sci-
entific knowledge about perception. The 
recent shift from the eye to the brain, from 
the after-image to the neuro-image,38 is a 
testament to this engagement.
i ts

VTaking the fundamental role of “the cut” into account, 
screenshotting as a process where the game player uses the 
camera or camera-function provided within the game to 
screen-capture a scene from the point of view of the playing 
character, could perhaps therefore be renamed as screen-
cutting. Even though a certain violence is implied by both 
terms, cutting involves a more multi-dimensional and less 
targeted operation. Its endpoint is not the arrival of a bullet 
(or bullet-like ray of light) that razors the world into submis-
sion, but rather the creation of a temporary 3D shape that 
subsequently becomes flattened and recognized as an image. 
The experience of capturing screens as images in a 3D game 
environment arguably allows us to move beyond the camera/
shutter model of perception, enacted by the supposedly fixed 
eyes which neatly slice the world into stills. This model, which 
was widely upheld up until the mid-nineteenth century but 
whose shadow still lingers in many contemporary conceptu-
alizations of vision as stable, acute and anchored, was based on 
the architecture of the camera obscura. The camera obscura’s 
monocular aperture became “a more perfect terminus for a 
30
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more perfect incarnation of a single point than the awkward binocular 
body of the human subject.”39 In-game camera activity can allow us to 
reclaim and reengage the body’s mobility and awkwardness. It can do this 
not so much by offering a prosthesis of vision in the gameworld but rather 
by becoming “an extension of our moving-and-perceiving body, in its 
dual nature as both subject and object in the world.”40 As well as being 
interested in the experiential enactments of some learned behaviors around 
perception, vision, mobility, and action in a controlled environment of the 
game, I was specifically drawn to the possibility of exploring framing as a 
corporeal-conceptual device for organizing the world. 
Framing is no doubt artificial, in that “reality” does not of course present 
itself to us in frames. This is perhaps a good moment to mention, albeit 
in passing, that many contemporary theories of perception adopt what is 
known as “conscious realism,” an updated yet reversed version of Bishop 
Berkeley’s conviction that reality, or at least what we humans call and 
perceive as reality, is only ever a product of our senses.41 Unlike Berkeley’s 
subjective idealism, this theory does not negate the existence of reality, that 
is of the actual material “stuff” that makes up the world, it only challenges 
the possibility of us ever accessing that reality in a true, unmediated way. In 
other words, we could say that we see what we need to see rather than what 
is “really” out there, while there is no one to assess and guarantee what this 
out-thereness looks like, as any attempt to describe, capture and measure it 
is inevitably entangled with the very devices, be it human or machinic, that 
undertake the process of description, capture and measurement. Framing is an 
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important part of this process, especially as knowledge and understanding, 
increasingly produced today in a visual form, typically come to us framed, 
from the rectangle of the book block to the square of Instagram. I would 
therefore go so far as to suggest that we frame the world in rectangles not 
because our visual apparatus encourages us to do so, but rather because 
rectangular frames, in the shape of mirrors, windows, books, and pictures, 
are already part of our established epistemological repertoire. 
Screenshotting in gameworlds has also offered me the opportunity 
to enact the fantasy of early industrial age: that of becoming an eye. 
With its antecedents in the plethora of optical instruments—such as opera 
glasses, bi- and monoculars and spyglasses42—made for the pleasure of 
the eighteenth-century urban voyeur, this fantasy has been re-channeled 
by the recent experiments with the omnipresent camera-eye, from the 
ill-fated Google Glass through to wearable cameras. The frequency and 
semi-automation with which camera phones are used today have cre-
ated a situation in which perception, experience and thus consciousness 
are permanently coupled with framing and capturing reality through a 
handheld rectangular glass device. The artificial, laboratory-like aspect 
of the game environment is therefore getting ever closer to the experi-
ence one has in the world outside the game. Game theorist Rune Klevjer 
argues that in “navigable 3D environments, the main ‘body’ of the avatar, 
in the phenomenological sense, is not the controllable marionette itself 
(for example Mario or Lara), but the navigable virtual camera, which 
becomes an extension of the player’s locomotive vision during play.”43 

34
3D games can thus be said to facilitate the enactment of a mediated desire for 
“becoming an eye”: that of “becoming a camera.” There is a long history of 
artists experimenting with image-making and vision in this way, from Alexander 
Rodchenko’s and László Moholy-Nagy’s adoption of the floating viewpoint of 
a bird or the angular perception of an insect through to Lindsay Seers literally 
becoming a camera by taking photos with her mouth.44 In gameworlds, this 
artist is no longer avant-garde, and they are not even an “artist” anymore. In the 
plethora of possibilities and angles on offer—2½D, over the player’s shoulder, 
camera-centered behind the player, unbroken first-person perspective, perspective 
switch, freelook—screencutting allows any player to produce a multi-perspec-
tival, multilayered tissue of images that are a direct result of them approaching 
a scene in a certain way. The images produced are therefore an outcome of the 
interwoven and mutually constitutive ecologies of perception and ecologies of 
media. 
In-game photography in the simulated space of the gameworld also allows 
for the denaturalization of perception: it reconnects the perceiving agent with 
the mechanics of its perceptive apparatus, while foregrounding the latter’s tech-
nical aspects. It is therefore perhaps more apposite to say that screenshotting not 
so much denaturalizes as, rather, demechanizes perception as a specific learned 
behavior. It also reframes being in the world as being a sensing agent, one whose 
openness to the world comes not just through the primary senses such as the eyes 
or ears but also through the distributed perceptive multi-organ that entails the 
whole body—what we earlier called, perhaps somewhat reductively, “the brain.” 
It thus allows us to see better—and to understand seeing both corporally and as 
a corporeal, haptic process. Shifting the human perceptive apparatus beyond its 
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conceptual lodging in the eye, screenshotting as enacted in 3D game environments 
allows players to become more attentive to the distributed nature of perception 
and vision, a process in which the whole of the human body is mobilized to 
produce images and thus to enable players to see the world. Screenshotting is 
therefore a way of retraining players’ eyes, bodies, and minds in both seeing the 
world and understanding perception better. This experience can generate new 
forms of sensation and cognition for experienced gamers as well as game novices. 
Indeed, for me the game environment became a space for reorienting myself as 
a distributed subject of perception and action, and for taking in this knowledge, 
mentally and corporeally.
This kind of experience could of course be undertaken in a different visual 
environment—an immersive art installation or even a city walk. Yet the game 
environment makes that task a little easier perhaps: both embracing and eliding 
the experience of mediation, it stages worldliness for us as a mobile task to explore 
and engage with, with our eyes, hands, brains and bodies all participating in 
seeing and/as doing. In Mobile Screens: The Visual Regime of Navigation, Nanna 
Verhoeff suggests that “interaction with screen-based interfaces already entails 
a performative, creative act.”45 She goes on to argue that in the visual regime of 
navigation movement itself is both performative and creative because it “not only 
transports the physical body, but affects the virtual realm of spatial representation. 
This implies a temporal collapse between making images and perceiving them.”46 
Here perception reveals itself to be an inherently creative task. In screenshotting 
the photographer’s eye extends beyond the optical apparats with its line of vision 
to reach onto the world in a more dynamic and enfolded way. 
We could thus go so far as to say that, paradoxically, the mediated experi-
ence of being in a video game denaturalizes the enculturation of photographic 
image-making as the objective representation of reality, while also opening 
up the apparatus beyond the eye-hand-world triangle. Once again, in-game 
photography is particularly predisposed to undertake this process of reposition-
ing human perception as ecological because the camera in the game is often 
invisible. Indeed, in many instances the whole body becomes a camera, as walking 
is itself an actively engaged mode of seeing and sensing. The coupling of these 
activities is actually imperative for the survival of the playing character in many 
games: otherwise, they simply get shot. Screenshotting thus allows one to escape 
screen shooting. It teaches the character how to navigate the world safely, but 
it also becomes a way of taking on and enacting perception with one’s whole 
body. Poignantly illustrating the error of the persistence of vision theory, it also 
playfully engages with it as a lingering shadow in understanding our perception 
of motion, in film and “in life.” If our “brain” is indeed believed to have evolved 
not to see “reality” but to help us survive,47 the constant flood of intermixed 
stimuli would be impossible to process as discrete pieces of information. Life 
can thus be redescribed as an ongoing process of navigating between cinema 
and photography, with image-making becoming a mode of world-making, for 
gamers and non-gamers alike.
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CODA
In a somewhat uncanny turn of events, I took first steps toward this 
project on perception and gaming in 2018, but the majority of the Flowcuts 
images were made in the early 2020. This meant that I was screenshotting 
the gameworlds that had been abandoned by their inhabitants as a result of 
some vaguely specified global-scale pandemics while becoming increasingly 
aware of the COVID-19 coronavirus epidemic developing in Wuhan, 
China. By the time I was ready to submit the images and the accompanying 
essay for publication in March 2020, the World Health Organization had 
announced a worldwide pandemic, with my home city of London, UK, 
going into partial lockdown. I started wondering whether I should pull the 
project altogether, rewrite it, or replay it through other games. I became 
anxious about the timing, or even about the work being seen as an example 
of disaster scholarship or trauma art, a cynical attempt to milk public anxiety 
for my own visual experimentation. In the end, I decided against changing 
it too much. Even though the project is ostensibly about perception, and it 
could therefore have been illustrated with a whole variety of other, visually 
“nicer” and safer, games, I cannot deny my own premonitory turn to the 
post-apocalyptic video games to think about how we see and frame the 
world. 
I also need to mention that I have been concerned with the apocalypse 
in my work for a while now. This interest has been fueled by the unfolding 
climate crisis and the accompanying economic disasters in different parts 
of the world in the aftermath of the global financial crash of 2008. I have 
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also been intrigued by the ongoing fascination with stories of our human 
collapse as a civilization and as a species. It’s important to note that it’s not 
the apocalypse as such that enthralls me, but rather the way we mobilize 
and utilize it in concepts, words and images. As part of this exploration, I 
have become increasingly suspicious of the so-called “ruin porn” associated 
with the representation of dilapidated landscapes, abandoned buildings and 
soon-to-expire worlds.48 In proposing the notion of a “feminist counter-
apocalypse” in a recent book,49 I wanted to raise questions about the modes 
of knowledge and visualization, and the paternalistic articulations related to 
them, that come from some contemporary prophets of doom and gloom. At 
the end of the day, many such prophets seem more interested in peddling 
their wares, be it the latest techno-fixes or the latest Great Ideas, than in 
developing more workable ways of collaboration and coexistence on our 
planet, for humans and nonhumans alike. Such totalized imaginings of the 
end of the world seem to forget that the apocalypse itself is not distributed 
equally. Many groups, tribes, people, and nations throughout our human 
history have already experienced vital threats to their existence, via envi-
ronmental or socio-political means. There is thus something politically 
disabling in adopting this all-encompassing apocalyptic tenor to describe 
the fate of the world for “us all.”
 This perhaps explains why in my first venture into videogaming, I chose 
games that dealt with imagining the apocalypse—a popular entertainment 
genre in different media in recent times, but one that offers particularly 
rich material for both training our imagination and exploring behavioral 
simulation in gameworlds. Yet we must remember that fascination with 
disaster kitsch is also a psychological mechanism, allowing us to cope with 
anxiety about the end of the world, be it our planet or our everyday ways 
of going about things. Indeed, ruin porn has a mollifying nature: it projects 
and forecasts horror and trauma for us so that we don’t have to spend time 
and energy imagining it, while also enclosing it for us in a series of palatable, 
albeit horror-inducing images. Apocalyptic imagery gives us the relief of 
being able to stare at a disaster from a distance, in the safety of our own 
home, computer or phone, while being able to slowly take it in. But it also 
becomes a carrier of our anxiety, framing disaster for us as pictures, while 
taking it away, for a short while at least.
In any kind of political or existential crisis, the question of perception, 
of our bodies and minds interacting with the world of which they are part 
to make meanings and interventions in it, remains fundamental. Because, 
before we figure out how we can mobilize the redemptive promise entailed 
in any apocalyptic narrative to try and make our world more livable, we 
need to ask a number of fundamental questions: How do we see what’s 
around us? How do we organize the flow of images, data, figures, affects, 
and percepts to construct a coherent picture of the world? When do we 
become ready to see things? How do we frame what we see? And how can 
we reframe it?
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